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Five Issues in the Design of Income Support Mechanisms: 
The Case of Italy
* 
 
Differently from most European countries and despite the recommendations on the part of 
the European Commission, Italy still misses a sufficiently systematic and nationwide 
mechanism of income support. In this paper we want to explore the feasibility, the desirability 
and the features of a universal policy of minimum income in Italy. We use a 
microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology in order to evaluate various 
alternatives mechanisms. We simulate the effects and the social welfare performance of 30 
reforms resulting from six versions of five basic types of income support mechanism: 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI), universal basic income (UBI), wage subsidy (WS) and 
two mixed systems: GMI+WS and UBI+WS. As welfare evaluation criteria we adopt the Gini 
Social Welfare function and the Poverty-Adjusted Gini Social Welfare function. All the reforms 
are calibrated so as to preserve fiscal neutrality. The simulation adopts a methodology that 
allows for market equilibrium and ensures a consistent comparative statics interpretation of 
the results. Universal and non mean-tested transfers (possibly complemented by wage 
subsidy) emerge as desirable and feasible features of the income support mechanism. In the 
most realistic scenarios, the social-welfare-optimal policies are a modest unconditional 
transfer amounting to 40% of the poverty line complemented by a 10% wage subsidy or – 
depending on the social welfare criterion – a more generous unconditional transfer (100% of 
the poverty line). The reforms can be financed by proportionally increasing the current 
marginal tax rates and widening the tax base to include all personal incomes. The set of 
universalistic policies that are preferable to the current system is very large and gives the 
opportunity of selecting a best reform according to many different criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
Differently from most European countries and despite the recommendations on the part of the EC, Italy still misses a 
sufficiently systematic and nationwide mechanism of income support, although various selective or conditional income 
maintenance policies are operating and some local authorities are experimenting forms of minimum income policy.
2 In 
this paper we explore the feasibility, the desirability and the features of a universal policy of minimum income in Italy. 
The starting point is provided by optimal taxation theory, i.e. we aim at designing an income support mechanism that 
replaces the actual policies and maximizes a given social welfare function subject to a public budget constraint. However, 
instead of looking for an analytical solution we adopt a computational-empirical approach.  Namely, we use a 
microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology in order to explore and evaluate various alternatives 
mechanisms. In illustrating the motivations, the methods and the results, we will refer to five issues that emerge as crucial 
in the analysis of reforms, whether hypothetical or implemented: 
1)  Is a universal income support mechanism feasible and desirable?  
2)  Should the mechanism consist of a transfer or a subsidy or a combination of the two? A significant part of the 
recent literature on the design of income support mechanisms is focussed on comparing transfer-like policies 
(such as the negative income tax, the demogrant, the basic income etc.) versus subsidy-like policies (such as 
earned income tax credit, in-work benefits etc.). The former permit the attainment of a minimum level of income 
through a lump-sum transfer, while the latter provide the opportunity of receiving a higher income by supporting 
a higher net age rate. Most numerical simulations done with the model of Mirrlees (1971) suggest as an optimal 
system a tax-transfer schedule with a lump-sum transfer, very high marginal tax rates on low income and almost 
constant marginal tax rates on average and high income. This scenario seems to have inspired many reforms 
(implemented or discussed) in the three decades 1970-80-90.  A second scenario emerges since the end of the 90s, 
with contributions (e.g. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001, 2002)) that make Mirrlees’ model more amenable to 
econometric applications and generalize it to include the decision of whether to work or not (not only – as in 
Mirrlees (1971) – the decision of how much to work). This latter extension is particularly relevant for the design 
of income support mechanisms. An influential contribution is represented by in particular by Saez (2002), whose 
model has been adopted in various applications (e.g. Immervoll et al., 2007; Haan et al., 2007; Blundell et al., 
2009). A frequent result emerging from these studies is the superiority of policies such as in-work benefits, or tax-
credit on low earnings. Interestingly, analogous policies have been in part implemented or considered as 
alternatives to mean-tested transfers in various countries during the last decade. The theoretical nature of the 
optimal taxation literature in practice has forced the analysis to address transfer-based and subsidy-based 
                                                 
2 While we are writing, in the EU countries only Greece, Hungary and Italy do not implement a nation-wide minimum income policy. Since 1992 the 
European Commission has issued many declarations and recommendations where minimum income policies emerge as a key instrument for 
enforcing fundamental human rights, reducing poverty and promoting social inclusion. A useful survey of minimum income policies in Europe is 
provided by Busilacchi (2008). 3 
 
mechanisms as if they were strictly alternative. But nothing prevents the design of mechanisms that combine the 
two policies. In what follows we will also consider such mixed policies.  
3)  Should a transfer be conditional or unconditional? The transfers mentioned at point 2) are typically conditional 
(e.g. mean-tested). Unconditional transfers have also been proposed (universal basic income, citizen income etc.). 
So far the idea of a universal and unconditional transfer has never reached the position of a dominating scenario 
but it remains an inspiring idea with oscillating fortunes. It has strong philosophical motivations (e.g. Van Parjis 
1995), but also cost-benefit and efficient incentives arguments are sometimes put forward: unconditional transfers 
do not incur the costs of verifying and monitoring the eligibility conditions; they do not create poverty traps; they 
might promote more autonomy and more efficient choices in the educational and occupational career etc. 
(Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2002, Standing 2008). Atkinson (2002) suggests that various processes in the 
modern economies might naturally drive the social policy institutions toward the universal basic income scenario. 
4)  How generous should the policy be? Every income support mechanism needs to specify the level of minimum 
income. This applies to transfer policies since they typically aim at guaranteeing that a certain minimum income 
is attained. But it also applies to incentive-base policies, since the subsidies are usually active only up to a certain 
level of income. The typical amount (in proposed or implemented reforms) is not larger than the poverty level and 
in most cases is much lower. This is so because the mechanisms are designed as complementary with respect to 
other welfare and social policies. There are however more extreme versions where the amount is supposed to be 
more substantial either because it is meant to replace the whole welfare state, as in Friedman (1962), or because it 
is thought as a fundamental political-economic restructuring of the market economy, as in Van Parijs (1995). 
5)  Should taxes (that also finance the income support mechanism) be progressive or flat? Universal mechanisms of 
income support (whether transfer-based or subsidy-based) have been frequently presented together with the 
proposal of a flat-tax. The motivation was to counterbalance the costs and/or the (supposedly) negative incentives 
coming from income support with better incentive to labour supply for the (supposedly) most productive fraction 
of the population. However, the above argument ignores the fact that labour supply elasticity is inversely related 
to income levels (Aaberge et al. 1999, 2002, 2011a, 2011b) and takes it for granted – despite the ambiguous 
empirical evidence – that income support mechanisms have strong negative effects on labour supply. When taking 
into account these empirical facts, we might be led instead to support a progressive taxation.  
 
   4 
 
2. The alternative policies 
In this section we summarize the main features of the hypothetical tax-transfer reforms that will be simulated under the 
assumption that they completely replace the actual tax-transfer system (a detailed description is provided in Appendix C). 
They are stylized cases representative of the different scenarios that are discussed or even actually implemented in many 
countries. A key parameter in the definition of the policies is the threshold G defined as follows. Let 
i x = total net available income (current) of household i (including both couples and singles). 
i N = total number of components of household i. 











P x = ɶ . Then i i G aP N = , where a 
is a proportion. For each reform we simulate three versions with different values of a: 1, 0.75 and 0.50. For example, G = 
0.5P 3  means that for a household with 3 components the threshold is ½ of the Poverty Line times the equivalence scale 
3 .
3 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). Each individual receives a transfer equal to G – I if single or G/2 – I if partner in 
a couple provided I < G (or I < G/2), where I denotes individual taxable income. This is the standard conditional (or 
means-tested) income support mechanism, close to a Negative Income Tax (Friedman 1962) with a 100% marginal tax 
rate on the transfer.  
Universal Basic Income (UBI). Each individual receives an unconditional transfer equal to G if single or G/2 if partner in 
a couple. It is the basic version of the system discussed for example by Van Parijs (1995) and also known in the policy 
debate as “citizen income” or “social dividend” (Meade, 1972; Van Trier, 1995).
4 
Wage Subsidy (WS). Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly wage and her/his income is not taxed as 
long as her/his gross income (including the subsidy) does not exceed G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. This is close 
to various in-work benefits or tax-credits reforms introduced in the USA (Earned Income Tax Credit), in the UK (In-Work 
Benefits) and recently also in Sweden. 
GMI + WS and UBI + WS are mixed mechanisms where the transfer is coupled with the wage subsidy, but with the 
threshold redefined as 0.5G.
5 
                                                 
3 The “square root scale” is one of the equivalence scales commonly used in OECD publications. 
4 A somewhat mitigated version has been proposed by Atkinson (1995, 1996) as Participation Income, where the transfer is conditional upon a test of 
“participation” (work, education, voluntary social activities, child care, homework etc.). 5 
 
For each of the above five types we distinguish two versions: a flat tax version, in which the income support mechanism is 
matched with a fixed marginal tax rate t applied to individual incomes above G for singles or G/2 for the partners of 
couple; a progressive tax version, in which the income support mechanism is matched with a progressive tax (that 
replicates the current system but with marginal tax rates proportionally adjusted according to a constant  ) that applies to 
incomes exceeding G (or G/2). The parameters t and   are endogenously determined within the reform simulation so that 
the total net tax revenue is equal to the one collected under the current tax-transfer system. Altogether we have 5 (types) × 
3 (values of a) × 2 (tax rules) = 30 reforms. 
All the tax-transfer policies are individual-based.
6  
 
3. The microeconometric model 
We develop a microeconometric model of household labour supply that is capable of simulating the household choices, 
taxes paid, transfers received, net available income and attained utility level given any tax-transfer rule regime, under the 
constraint of a constant total net tax revenue.  
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the model. Here we offer an intuitive overview. Although we actually treat 
both couples and singles, for the sake of simplicity the following illustration considers singles.  
The model assumes households are endowed with unearned income y and face a set A of opportunities (“jobs”) 
characterized by hours of market work required (h), gross wage rate (w) and other characteristics (j). The opportunity set 
includes non-market “jobs” (i.e. activities – such as child care or education – outside the labour market, with h = 0 and 
therefore wh = 0). Opportunity sets can differ across households, both in terms of wage rates and in terms of availability 
of market jobs (including the case of no market job available) with different hours and characteristics. The tax-transfer 
rule R (actual or simulated) transforms the gross incomes (wh, y) into the net available income C. The household 
preferences upon alternative jobs are represented by a utility function U(h, C, j). The model assumes households choose a 
job so as to maximize U(h, C, j) subject to the opportunity constraint ( , , ) h w j A Î  and the budget constraint 
( , ). C R wh y = Under this assumption, the observed choices reveal the household preferences and with appropriate datasets 
and statistical procedures it is therefore possible to estimate a parametric specification of the utility function. Once we 
have estimated the utility function, we can simulate what the household choices would be when facing a different 
opportunity set, e.g. one induced by a tax-transfer reform. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 A mixed system close to GMI+WS has been proposed by De Vincenti and Paladini (2009). 
6 We also simulated German-like (income splitting) household-based versions, but they were mostly dominated (in terms of welfare effects) by the 




4. Social Welfare evaluation 
Since the tax-transfer reforms in general have different effects on different households we need a criterion to “aggregate” 
all the micro-effects into a synthetic index in order to be able to compare and evaluate the reforms. We will use two 
indexes. The first one is based on Sen (1974, 1976), who proposed to compare different statuses of the economy by 
computing namely (1 ), I m - where m is the average income and I is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. This 
measure has the intuitive appeal of expressing social welfare as the product of an efficiency measure (average income, i.e. 
the average size of the “pie’s slices”) time a familiar equality measure (1– I), i.e. a measure of how equally the “pie” is 
allocated among the households). We apply the same idea using money-metric utility instead of income. Let  ( )
n R m be the 
maximum money-metric utility attained under tax-transfer regime R by household n (computed as explained in Section 
A.6 of Appendix A) and 
1





m m = ∑
 
Let  ( ) I R be the Gini coefficient of the sample distribution of  ( ).
n R m  We 
then define the Gini Social Welfare (GSW) function as follows:
7 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) GSW R R I R m = - . 
The second index – the Poverty-adjusted Gini Social Welfare (PAGSW) – is a generalization that gives a specific weight 
to poverty (Atkinson 1987): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) PAGSW R R I R p R m = - -  
where ( ) p R is the head-count poverty ratio under the tax-transfer regime . R  
 
5. Simulation procedure 
The simulation has two distinctive features that are not common in the tax reform literature. First, the reforms are 
simulated under the constraint of being fiscally neutral, i.e. they generate the same total net tax revenue as the current 
1998 system. This requires a two-level simulation procedure. At the “low” level, household choices are simulated given 
the values of the tax-transfer parameters. At the “high” level, the tax-transfer parameters are calibrated so that the total net 
tax revenue remains constant. The calibration parameters are the constant tax rate t in the Flat tax systems and the 
proportional change τ of the current marginal tax rates in the Progressive tax systems.
8 Second, the simulation is 
conducted under equilibrium conditions for different hypothetical values of the elasticity of the demand for labour. 
Traditionally, the simulation of tax reforms are interpreted as comparative statics exercises in a long-run perspective, i.e. 
                                                 
7 For a theoretical justification of this social welfare function (as a member of a wider class) see for example Aaberge (2007) and Aaberge et al. 
(2011b). 
8 Current (1998) marginal tax rates are reported in Appendix C. 7 
 
assuming a perfectly elastic labour demand (constant wage rates). At the other extreme, non-behavioural simulations can 
be interpreted as simulations in the very short-run. There are of course an infinity of intermediate scenarios. We adopt a 
procedure that is specifically appropriate for the microeconometric model and makes the simulation results consistent with 
the comparative statics interpretation. The procedure is fully explained in Colombino (2010) and more concisely in the 
Appendix B to this paper.  
We perform six types of simulations, corresponding to different treatment of equilibrium:  
Non behavioural. Household choices are left unchanged, while their incomes are changed according to the new tax-
benefit rules. This can be considered as a prediction of the very short-run. 
No account for equilibrium. This is the standard procedure. Labour supply responses are simulated while keeping wage 
rates unchanged. Usually this is interpreted as a long run prediction under the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic demand for 
labour. However, as we argue in Appendix B, this interpretation in general is not correct when adopting a model that 
incorporates a representation of demand condition (the multinomial logit with alternative-specific dummies). 
Demand elasticity η= 0, -0.5, -1. Most empirical studies of wage elasticity of the demand for labour suggest values in the 
range (-0.5, -1). 
Demand elasticity η= -∞. This is a theoretical benchmark. It should be interpreted as indicating the direction towards 
which we move if we assume a very elastic demand.  
We consider as realistic scenarios those with η = -0.5 and η = -1. The other cases are reported as benchmarks. 
 
6. Results 
Tables 1 – 3 illustrate the main welfare evaluation results. We start by commenting the results of Tables 1 and 2 following 
the six-issue outline introduced in section 1. Moreover, if not otherwise indicated, we refer to the results obtained under 
the most realistic scenarios, i.e. η = -0.5 or -1. The policies (30 reforms plus the current system) are ranked – the most 
preferred on top – according to the social welfare functions presented in section 4. Each reform is identified by three 
pieces of information: the income support mechanism (GMI etc.), the Flat (F) or Progressive (P) tax rule and the value of 
a (0.5, 0.75 or 1). For example, UBI+WS_F_0.75 denotes a policy where the income support mechanism is UBI+WS, the 
tax rule is Flat and  0.75 . G P N =  
1)  Most reforms rank better than the current system under both social welfare criteria. The only exception appears 
when η = ∞ and the policies are ranked according to the GSW: in this case, no reform turns out as preferred to the 
current system. However η = ∞ represents a benchmark case rather than a realistic scenario. In all the other cases 
there is a very large menu of universalistic reforms that dominate (in terms of welfare) the current system. 
Therefore the answer to the first issue mentioned in section 1 is definitively affirmative. As we comment below, 8 
 
the welfare criteria adopted here gives specific answers as to what mechanisms are best. However, also from the 
point of view of different criteria, we have many alternatives among which to choose in order to improve upon the 
current system. 
2)  In most cases, the first four or five positions in the ranking are occupied by transfer-based mechanisms or by 
mixed policies envisaging both transfers and subsidies. Under this respect, we observe a marked difference 
between the GSW criterion and the PAGSW criterion. The former criterion favours the mixed policy UBI+WS 
while the latter favours a pure UBI. 
3)  Overall, mechanisms envisaging unconditional transfers (UBI or UBI+WS) rank better than the conditional 
systems. The greater generosity of the unconditional transfers is compensated by the lack of poverty-trap effects, 
so that the conditional and the unconditional systems imply similar very modest reductions in labour supply; 
however, the unconditional systems perform better in favouring distributional equity and reducing poverty. 
4)  Under GSW, the basic transfer should be 75% of the poverty line; under the PAGSW it should be 100%. 
5)  In most cases Progressive tax systems are preferable to Flat tax systems. A contribution to this result comes from 
the pattern of wage elasticity of labour supply: higher income households are much less elastic than lower income 
ones (Aaberge et al. 1999, 2002, 2004; Aaberge and Colombino 2011a,  2011b; Røed and Strøm 2002).
9  
In summary, the indications for a best mechanism converge on UBI+WS_P_0.75 (under the GSW criterion) or UBI_P_1 
(under the PAGSW criterion).  
In Table 3 we report the result of a regression analysis of the results obtained under the scenario with η = -1. The value of 
the Social Welfare function is regressed against a set of variables measuring the key features of the tax-transfer systems. 
The regressions help to identify the welfare contribution of policy attributes. Under the GSW criterion, the results confirm 
that the progressivity of the tax rule and the non-conditionality of the income support mechanism have a significant 
positive effect. The coverage a has a positive marginal effect up to around 0.70. The picture produced by the PAGSW 
criterion is partially different. Overall the coefficients are much larger, since there is much more variation in the GSW 
than in the PAGSW. The effects of Progressive and Unconditional are positive as under the GSW, but less significant. 
Instead the effect of Subsidy is negative and significant. Coverage has a positive marginal effect even above 1. 
What specific features do the best mechanisms have and how do they fare from the perspective of other possibly relevant 
criteria, such as marginal tax rates or behavioural effects?  Tables 5 – 10 provide many relevant details.  Here the policies 
are listed in alphabetic order. For each type of simulation (No Behaviour, No equilibrium etc.) and for each policy the 
tables report the results listed in the Legenda (Table 4). The following comments consider what happens under the 
scenario with η = -1 (Table 9).  
                                                 
9 A recent survey by Diamond and Saez (2011) gives support to the superiority of progressive taxes. This conclusion might be mitigated or even 
reversed if one accounted for the transparency and simplicity of the tax rule, for incentives to tax elusion/evasion and in general for a more general 
concept of behavioural response to taxes as in the “taxable income” approach (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002).     9 
 
1)  UBI+WS_P_0.75 (UBI_P_1) envisages an average monthly transfer of 720 (1060) Euros (1998). This is to be 
compared with the 101 Euros of the CURRENT system.
10 The percentages of utility-winners and of income-
winners are respectively 69 (57) and 65 (58). The percentage poverty rate (head count) is 0.9 (0), to be compared 
to 4.23 under the CURRENT system.  
2)  Typical objections against universalistic policy of income support are based on the expectation of high tax rates 
required by the public budget constraint and of strong disincentive effects on labour supply. The first expectation 
is confirmed by our results. The best (welfare-wise) policies are costly in terms of marginal tax rates. 
UBI+WS_P_0.75 would require an 11% increase of the current (1998) marginal tax rates, which means a 50% top 
marginal tax rate. Under the same scenario UBI_P_1 requires a 60% top marginal tax rate. It should be noticed 
that these figures are high but not at all unrealistic. For example in 2009 the top marginal tax rates in Denmark 
and Sweden were respectively around 62% and 57%. At any rate, if the above tax rates were judged for some 
reasons not feasible (possibly from the point of view of political consensus), we have already noticed that the 
menu of welfare improving reforms is very large. For example, the flat version UBI+WS_F_0.75 would require a 
42% flat rate. The second expectation (strong disincentive effects on labour supply) is not supported by our 
results: the overall disincentive effects are small.  
3)  When we account for behavioural responses and for market equilibrium, the policies turn out to be less costly 
(tax-wise) than when we assume no behavioural responses or we do not account for market equilibrium. In 
shaping the simulation results there is a subtle interplay between the behavioural responses and the market 
equilibrium process. Overall, the reform induce a (modest) shift to the left of the labour supply curve, therefore 
the new market equilibrium requires a higher gross wage rate (provided η > -∞). The pure effect on taxation of the 
behavioural responses can be identified by compare Table 5 to Table 10, where η = -∞ and therefore wage rates 
remain unchanged. The reform UBI+WS_P_0.75 would require a 14% increase in current marginal tax rates when 
assuming no behavioural responses (Table 5). The same reform would instead require a 12% increase in current 
marginal tax rates when accounting for behaviour (but leaving wage rates unchanged). Despite the overall 
reduction in labour supply, the reform induces a more efficient composition of employment Last, if we assume 
η=-1 (Table 9), the increase would be 11%: higher gross wage help in collecting tax revenue and therefore the 
reform requires a lower increase in marginal tax rates. 
4)  Accounting for behavioural responses and market equilibrium does also have significant implications for the 
ranking position of the policies. The differences in ranking are more marked when the GSW criterion is used. It 
seems that with the PAGSW criterion the rankings are strongly influenced by the effects on the head-count 
poverty index, which in turn are similar across different simulation procedure: as a consequence the differences in 
rankings are mitigated, especially among the highest rank positions.   
                                                 
10 It should be noticed that the 101 Euros transfer in the CURRENT system is just the average of various categorical, conditional or local transfers 




We used a microeconometric model and a social evaluation methodology in order to identify optimal universalistic 
income support mechanisms in Italy. We consider five type of mechanism: GMI, UBI, WS, GMI+WS and UBI+WS. 
Each one has three variants, depending on the degree of coverage with respect to the poverty line: 50%, 75% and 100%. 
Moreover, each type can be match either with Flat tax rule or with a Progressive Tax rule. In total we have 5×3×2 = 30 
possible reforms. The tax parameter (either constant flat rate in the Flat rule or the proportional change in the marginal tax 
rates with respect to the current (1998) system in the Progressive rule) is determined endogenously so that the total net tax 
revenue remains as under the current system. The simulation adopts a methodology (Colombino 2010) that allows for 
market equilibrium and ensures a consistent comparative statics interpretation of the simulation results. Accounting for 
behavioural responses and market equilibrium has important implications in shaping the simulation results. In the most 
realistic scenarios (i.e. wage elasticity of labour demand in the range [-0.5, -1.0]) the best policies are UBI+WS with a 
75% coverage and a progressive tax rule (under the GSW criterion) or UBI with a 100% coverage and a progressive tax 
rule (under the PAGSW criterion). Given the chosen social welfare criteria, universality, non-conditionality, progressivity, 
wage subsidies (under the GSW criterion) and a minimum income close to 75% of the poverty line or above, emerge as 
desirable features of an optimal income support mechanism. In general, the set of universalistic policies that are preferable 
to the current system is very large and gives the opportunity of selecting a best reform according to many different 
criteria.   11 
 
 
Table 1. Policies ranked (from best to worst) according to the GSW criterion   
No behaviour  No equilibrium  Equilibrium η = 0  Equilibrium η = -0.5  Equilibrium η = -1  Equilibrium η = -oo 
UBI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1  GMI  F  1  UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75  CURRENT 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI  P  0.75  GMI  F  0.75  UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5 
UBI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI  F  0.75  WS  P  0.75  UBI  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.5 
UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  GMI  P  1  UBI+WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.75  UBI  F  0.5 
WS  P  1  UBI  P  1  UBI  F  0.5  UBI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5 
UBI  P  1  WS  P  1  GMI  P  0.75  WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  1  UBI  P  1  WS  F  0.5 
WS  P  0.75  WS  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5 
WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5  UBI  F  1  GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.5 
UBI  F  1  UBI  F  1  GMI  P  0.5  WS  F  1  WS  P  1  GMI  P  0.5 
UBI  F  0.75  UBI  F  0.75  GMI  F  0.5  WS  P  1  WS  F  1  GMI  F  0.5 
GMI+WS  P  1  GMI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI  F  1  UBI  F  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  F  1  UBI  F  0.75  UBI  F  1  GMI+WS  P  0.75 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  1  WS  F  0.75 
WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  0.75  UBI  F  0.5  UBI  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.75 
UBI+WS  F  1  UBI  F  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5  WS  F  0.75  GMI  P  0.5  WS  P  0.75 
UBI  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75  GMI  P  0.5  WS  F  0.75  UBI  F  0.75 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI  P  0.75 
WS  F  0.75  GMI  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  1  GMI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  0.75 
GMI  P  0.5  GMI  P  1  GMI+WS  P  0.75  WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI  P  0.75 
GMI+WS  F  1  GMI  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI  P  0.75  WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  0.75 
GMI  P  0.75  CURRENT 
   
GMI+WS  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.5  GMI  P  0.75  WS  F  1 
GMI  P  1  UBI+WS  F  0.5  UBI+WS  P  1  GMI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  1 
CURRENT  GMI+WS  F  0.75  WS  F  1  GMI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1  WS  P  1 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  1  WS  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1  GMI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  0.5  WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  P  1 
WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  0.75  WS  F  0.75  CURRENT 
   
GMI  F  0.75  UBI  F  1 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  1  CURRENT  UBI+WS  F  1 
GMI  F  1  WS  F  1  WS  P  0.75  GMI  F  0.5  GMI  F  1  UBI  P  1 
GMI  F  0.75  WS  F  0.75  CURRENT  GMI  F  0.75  GMI  F  0.5  GMI  P  1 




Table 2. Policies ranked (from best to worst) according to the PAGSW criterion 
   
No behaviour  No equilibrium  Equilibrium η = 0  Equilibrium η = -0.5  Equilibrium η = -1  Equilibrium η = -oo 
UBI  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1  UBI  F  1  UBI  P  1  UBI  P  1  UBI  P  0.75 
UBI  F  1  UBI  P  0.75  UBI  P  0.75  UBI  F  1  UBI  F  1  UBI  F  0.75 
UBI  F  0.75  UBI  P  1  UBI  F  0.75  UBI  P  0.75  UBI  P  0.75  UBI  F  1 
GMI  P  1  UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  1  GMI  F  1  GMI  F  1  UBI  P  1 
GMI  F  1  UBI+WS  P  0.75  GMI  P  1  GMI  P  1  GMI  P  1  GMI  P  1 
UBI  F  0.75  UBI  F  1  UBI+WS  P  1  UBI  F  0.75  UBI  F  0.75  GMI  F  1 
UBI+WS  P  1  UBI  F  0.75  GMI  F  1  UBI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  P  1  UBI  P  0.5 
UBI  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  UBI  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  1 
UBI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  1  GMI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  1  GMI  P  0.75 
GMI  P  0.75  GMI  P  1  UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  P  1  UBI  F  0.5 
UBI  F  0.5  UBI  F  0.5  GMI+WS  P  1  GMI+WS  P  1  GMI  P  0.75  GMI  F  0.75 
GMI  F  0.75  WS  P  1  UBI  F  0.5  UBI  F  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  WS  P  0.75  GMI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  P  0.75  UBI  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  1 
GMI+WS  P  1  WS  P  0.5  GMI  F  0.75  GMI  F  0.75  GMI  F  0.75  GMI+WS  P  1 
GMI+WS  F  1  UBI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  1 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  GMI  P  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.75  UBI+WS  F  0.75 
GMI  P  0.5  GMI+WS  F  1  GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  P  0.75 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  GMI  F  1  UBI+WS  P  0.5  GMI  P  0.5  GMI  P  0.5  GMI  P  0.5 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5  UBI+WS  P  0.5 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI  P  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  0.75  GMI+WS  F  0.75 
GMI  F  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.75  WS  P  1  WS  P  1  WS  P  1  GMI  F  0.5 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  current 
   
GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI  F  0.5  GMI  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.5 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  P  1  UBI+WS  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.5  UBI+WS  F  0.5  WS  P  1 
WS  P  1  UBI+WS  F  0.5  GMI  F  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5  GMI+WS  P  0.5 
WS  F  1  GMI+WS  F  0.75  WS  P  0.75  WS  P  0.75  WS  P  0.75  GMI+WS  F  0.5 
WS  P  0.75  GMI  F  0.75  WS  F  1  WS  F  1  WS  F  1  WS  P  0.75 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  GMI+WS  F  0.5  WS  F  1 
WS  F  0.75  GMI  F  0.5  WS  F  0.75  WS  F  0.75  WS  F  0.75  CURRENT 
WS  P  0.5  WS  F  1  WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5  WS  P  0.5 
CURRENT  WS  F  0.75  CURRENT  CURRENT  CURRENT  WS  F  0.75 
WS  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5  WS  F  0.5 13 
 
Table 3. Effects of policy attributes on Social Welfare. Regression coefficients (t-Statistics in parenthesis) 
 
  GSW  PAGSW 
Constant  94233.08 (12.22)  88787.22 (70.80) 
Progressive      12.37 (3.37)     457.59  (1.32) 
Coverage      87.22 (2.37)  8260.96 (2.19) 
Coverage
2      -65.46 (-2.48)  -2995.58 (-1.11) 
Unconditional      16.49 (4.72)   274.49 (0.77) 
Subsidy       2.16 (0.62)   -1944.72  (-5.43) 
Note to Table 3 
Progressive = 1 if tax rule is progressive (0 otherwise) 
Coverage = the value of a (for the CURRENT system we set a = 0.1); 
Coverage
2 = Coverage squared; 
Unconditional = 1 if income support mechanism is UBI or UBI+WS (0 otherwise); 
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Table 4. Legenda for Tables 5 - 10 
(a) = either the CURRENT tax-transfer rule or a reform: the first label refers to the income support mechanism, the second 
label denotes flat (F) or progressive (P) marginal tax rates, the last number is the guaranteed minimum income as a 
proportion of the poverty line. 
(b): average male weekly expected hours of work (including the 0 hours of non participants). 
(c): average female weekly expected hours of work (including the 0 hours of non participants). 
(d): average monthly gross income (Euros 1998). 
(e): average monthly net available income (Euros 1998). 
(f): for Flat tax rules, it is the constant tax rates; for Progressive tax rules, it is the proportional increase with respect to the 
current marginal rates (reported in Appendix C).  
(g): average monthly transfer (Euros 1998). 
(h): proportion of utility-winners (household n is a utility-winner under reform  1 R with respect to the current system 0 R if 
1 0 ( ) ( )
n n R R m m >  - see section 4). 
(i): proportion of income-winners (a household is a income-winner if household’s net available income is higher under the 
reform than under the current system). 
(l): poverty ratio (head-count rate) = number of poor as a percentage of the number of households in the sample. 
(m): poverty-gap ratio = average distance between the poverty line and the incomes of the poor, as a percentage of the 
poverty line. 
(n): income-gap ratio = distance between the poverty line and the average income of the poor, as a percentage of the 
poverty line.  
(o): Gini Social Welfare. 
(p): Poverty-adjusted Gini Social Welfare.     







   
Table 5. No Behaviour 
 









































































































































































































CURRENT  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  81466  77829 
GMI  F  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2194  0.31  192  0.38  0.57  2.95  0.31  10.51  81449  78911 
GMI  F  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2196  0.37  265  0.37  0.60  0.97  0.06  6.50  81451  80619 
GMI  F  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2201  0.45  349  0.41  0.58  0.01  0.00  0.81  81452  81447 
GMI  P  0.5  39.34  19.45  2930  2191  0.02  192  0.52  0.63  2.38  0.25  10.63  81469  79427 
GMI  P  0.75  39.34  19.45  2930  2192  0.07  265  0.49  0.60  0.87  0.06  6.69  81468  80723 
GMI  P  1  39.33  19.45  2930  2195  0.13  349  0.47  0.60  0.02  0.00  1.12  81467  81448 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2197  0.36  405  0.46  0.58  3.82  0.50  13.06  81457  78175 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2198  0.40  435  0.48  0.62  2.65  0.28  10.49  81463  79189 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2200  0.45  467  0.51  0.64  1.53  0.12  8.11  81469  80151 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2187  0.06  405  0.61  0.63  3.25  0.41  12.63  81478  78686 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2183  0.09  435  0.59  0.61  2.40  0.26  10.65  81478  79418 
GMI+WS  P  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2179  0.13  467  0.57  0.59  1.46  0.13  9.15  81479  80226 
UBI  F  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2205  0.41  568  0.53  0.63  0.91  0.06  6.95  81474  80693 
UBI  F  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2210  0.50  814  0.53  0.60  0.08  0.00  2.80  81480  81413 
UBI  F  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2214  0.60  1060  0.53  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.00  81480  81480 
UBI  P  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2204  0.13  568  0.62  0.63  0.60  0.04  6.34  81493  80979 
UBI  P  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2209  0.22  814  0.59  0.63  0.04  0.00  3.36  81494  81464 
UBI  P  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2213  0.32  1060  0.56  0.62  0.00  0.00  0.00  81490  81490 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2200  0.38  598  0.50  0.61  3.29  0.38  11.64  81463  78631 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2203  0.42  721  0.53  0.64  1.96  0.17  8.84  81469  79786 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2206  0.47  844  0.53  0.63  0.83  0.05  5.92  81475  80761 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2201  0.10  598  0.68  0.67  2.46  0.24  9.88  81489  79373 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2205  0.14  721  0.66  0.65  1.15  0.08  7.08  81494  80505 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2210  0.18  844  0.64  0.64  0.33  0.01  4.40  81501  81218 
WS  F  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2201  0.34  352  0.51  0.57  4.59  0.75  16.29  81462  77518 
WS  F  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2203  0.36  352  0.57  0.62  4.05  0.60  14.92  81469  77988 
WS  F  1  39.35  19.45  2930  2205  0.39  352  0.62  0.64  3.55  0.49  13.86  81477  78420 
WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  0.04  352  0.65  0.64  4.12  0.63  15.30  81483  77939 
WS  P  0.75  39.35  19.45  2930  2189  0.05  352  0.67  0.64  3.69  0.55  14.98  81487  78312 




   
Table 6. No Equilibrium 
 









































































































































































































CURRENT  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  94255  86391 
GMI  F  0.5  39.32  19.22  2925  2190  0.31  194  0.39  0.56  2.97  0.31  10.58  94241  86375 
GMI  F  0.75  39.28  19.07  2912  2183  0.38  269  0.37  0.55  0.93  0.06  6.39  94244  863835 
GMI  F  1  39.23  18.91  2896  2176  0.46  357  0.40  0.53  0.00  0.00  0.16  94248  86394 
GMI  P  0.5  39.31  19.24  2922  2185  0.02  194  0.52  0.62  2.36  0.25  10.55  94259  86393 
GMI  P  0.75  39.27  19.08  2909  2176  0.07  269  0.47  0.57  0.87  0.05  6.22  94259  86397 
GMI  P  1  39.22  18.91  2892  2168  0.14  357  0.45  0.55  0.01  0.00  0.66  94259  86404 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.34  19.38  2932  2198  0.36  406  0.47  0.59  3.90  0.51  13.11  94248  86380 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.32  19.31  2926  2195  0.40  435  0.49  0.61  2.69  0.28  10.40  94253  86387 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.30  19.24  2919  2191  0.45  467  0.50  0.60  1.38  0.12  8.68  94260  86394 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  39.33  19.39  2930  2187  0.06  405  0.60  0.63  3.26  0.41  12.63  94267  86393 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  39.31  19.32  2923  2177  0.09  435  0.58  0.59  2.34  0.25  10.64  94268  86392 
GMI+WS  P  1  39.29  19.24  2915  2167  0.13  467  0.56  0.56  1.43  0.13  8.96  94270  86391 
UBI  F  0.5  39.28  19.22  2915  2192  0.41  568  0.51  0.59  0.86  0.06  6.84  94265  86404 
UBI  F  0.75  39.23  19.06  2897  2183  0.51  814  0.51  0.56  0.06  0.00  2.91  94271  86415 
UBI  F  1  39.17  18.90  2876  2172  0.61  1060  0.50  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.00  94272  86420 
UBI  P  0.5  39.27  19.23  2907  2185  0.13  568  0.60  0.60  0.52  0.04  6.73  94283  86422 
UBI  P  0.75  39.21  19.06  2885  2173  0.23  814  0.56  0.58  0.04  0.00  2.52  94285  86428 
UBI  P  1  39.15  18.89  2859  2158  0.33  1060  0.54  0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  94280  86428 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.33  19.36  2930  2200  0.38  598  0.51  0.61  3.30  0.40  12.04  94253  86389 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.31  19.28  2922  2196  0.43  720  0.52  0.62  1.96  0.17  8.78  94260  86398 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.28  19.21  2914  2193  0.47  843  0.51  0.60  0.73  0.05  6.25  94266  86407 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.32  19.38  2924  2196  0.10  597  0.66  0.66  2.44  0.24  9.75  94279  86414 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.29  19.30  2914  2193  0.14  719  0.64  0.62  1.01  0.07  7.43  94285  86422 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.26  19.22  2903  2189  0.19  842  0.61  0.61  0.17  0.01  6.80  94292  86430 
WS  F  0.5  39.36  19.49  2921  2205  0.34  352  0.52  0.58  4.67  0.76  16.29  91925  85178 
WS  F  0.75  39.36  19.50  2919  2207  0.36  352  0.57  0.63  4.16  0.62  14.87  91933  85186 
WS  F  1  39.35  19.50  2918  2208  0.39  352  0.62  0.65  3.56  0.50  13.91  91941  85194 
WS  P  0.5  39.36  19.53  2922  2197  0.04  352  0.65  0.65  4.11  0.64  15.48  94272  86400 
WS  P  0.75  39.35  19.52  2920  2193  0.05  352  0.68  0.65  3.67  0.55  15.01  94276  86401 





Table 7. Equilibrium: h h h h = 0 
 









































































































































































































CURRENT  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  94255  90047 
GMI  F  0.5  39.39  19.50  3193  2433  0.29  191  0.83  0.91  3.60  0.40  10.98  94324  90745 
GMI  F  0.75  39.38  19.47  3306  2533  0.33  260  0.88  0.95  1.81  0.15  8.13  94363  92561 
GMI  F  1  39.36  19.38  3360  2587  0.39  339  0.89  0.95  0.58  0.02  4.05  94388  93809 
GMI  P  0.5  39.36  19.45  3117  2366  0.00  191  0.84  0.89  2.94  0.31  10.50  94326  91399 
GMI  P  0.75  39.35  19.36  3174  2421  0.02  263  0.87  0.92  1.30  0.10  7.38  94345  93052 
GMI  P  1  39.31  19.26  3234  2476  0.07  342  0.86  0.91  0.21  0.01  4.61  94352  94148 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.37  19.50  3043  2307  0.35  406  0.72  0.80  4.04  0.54  13.42  94285  90266 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.37  19.48  3086  2346  0.38  435  0.80  0.87  3.00  0.33  10.88  94306  91321 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.35  19.44  3114  2372  0.42  466  0.82  0.89  1.85  0.17  9.10  94322  92477 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.46  2976  2246  0.05  405  0.74  0.76  3.44  0.44  12.71  94289  90871 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  39.33  19.39  2969  2245  0.07  435  0.74  0.77  2.42  0.25  10.10  94290  91879 
GMI+WS  P  1  39.31  19.37  3041  2306  0.10  466  0.78  0.80  1.12  0.11  9.59  94299  93182 
UBI  F  0.5  39.35  19.48  3170  2426  0.38  568  0.86  0.92  1.28  0.10  7.43  94348  93079 
UBI  F  0.75  39.31  19.35  3166  2430  0.47  814  0.84  0.89  0.12  0.01  6.13  94361  94238 
UBI  F  1  39.23  19.07  3027  2317  0.58  1060  0.69  0.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  94328  94328 
UBI  P  0.5  39.31  19.40  3064  2334  0.11  568  0.83  0.83  0.62  0.05  7.97  94340  93727 
UBI  P  0.75  39.23  19.15  2951  2244  0.22  814  0.67  0.67  0.06  0.00  2.94  94313  94258 
UBI  P  1  39.08  18.67  2646  1986  0.38  1060  0.38  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  94206  94206 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.37  19.51  3069  2333  0.37  599  0.79  0.85  3.49  0.43  12.25  94300  90830 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.36  19.48  3113  2374  0.41  721  0.83  0.89  2.21  0.21  9.65  94323  92128 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.34  19.43  3131  2394  0.44  844  0.84  0.90  1.02  0.08  7.66  94337  93322 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.43  2988  2264  0.09  598  0.78  0.79  2.58  0.27  10.46  94303  91732 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.31  19.34  2960  2248  0.11  720  0.74  0.73  1.00  0.08  7.62  94301  93311 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.26  19.24  2964  2249  0.16  841  0.66  0.64  0.27  0.01  3.56  94281  94013 
WS  F  0.5  39.37  19.53  2944  2225  0.34  353  0.57  0.63  4.67  0.76  16.33  94258  89610 
WS  F  0.75  39.36  19.53  2940  2224  0.36  352  0.62  0.66  4.17  0.62  14.88  94265  90120 
WS  F  1  39.36  19.53  2933  2221  0.39  352  0.65  0.68  3.65  0.50  13.79  94271  90646 
WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.50  2895  2180  0.04  352  0.63  0.62  4.18  0.64  15.19  94266  90106 
WS  P  0.75  39.34  19.47  2857  2153  0.04  352  0.57  0.54  3.63  0.52  14.45  94258  90649 
WS  P  1  39.34  19.52  2920  2206  0.07  351  0.67  0.65  3.01  0.38  12.46  94268  91273 





   
Table 8. Equilibrium: h h h h = -0.5 
 









































































































































































































CURRENT  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  94255  90047 
GMI  F  0.5  39.31  19.27  2923  2202  0.31  193  0.46  0.60  3.09  0.32  10.37  94248  91176 
GMI  F  0.75  39.26  19.10  2906  2191  0.38  269  0.42  0.58  0.92  0.06  0.61  94247  93333 
GMI  F  1  39.21  18.94  2889  2183  0.45  356  0.41  0.54  0.00  0.00  0.18  94251  94248 
GMI  P  0.5  39.30  19.29  2921  2198  0.02  193  0.59  0.65  2.50  0.26  10.47  94269  91785 
GMI  P  0.75  39.26  19.12  2903  2189  0.05  269  0.52  0.59  0.65  0.05  7.41  94262  93613 
GMI  P  1  39.19  18.93  2877  2169  0.14  356  0.43  0.52  0.01  0.00  0.23  94242  94237 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.33  19.42  2932  2211  0.36  406  0.52  0.62  3.88  0.51  13.19  94256  90398 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.31  19.34  2923  2206  0.40  435  0.54  0.64  2.77  0.28  10.24  94260  91511 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.29  19.28  2916  2202  0.45  467  0.56  0.64  1.54  0.12  8.07  94266  92732 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  38.76  20.13  2937  2212  0.06  408  0.63  0.70  3.43  0.42  12.29  94279  90864 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  38.72  20.08  2929  2210  0.07  437  0.63  0.68  2.36  0.24  10.05  94278  91928 
GMI+WS  P  1  38.66  20.00  2912  2193  0.13  468  0.54  0.57  0.81  0.09  11.17  94258  93455 
UBI  F  0.5  39.27  19.26  2910  2202  0.41  568  0.56  0.62  0.87  0.06  7.08  94270  93410 
UBI  F  0.75  39.22  19.09  2889  2190  0.51  814  0.52  0.57  0.06  0.00  3.11  94272  94215 
UBI  F  1  39.16  18.93  2867  2178  0.60  1060  0.51  0.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  94273  94273 
UBI  P  0.5  39.26  19.26  2902  2195  0.13  568  0.62  0.62  0.52  0.04  6.96  94289  93770 
UBI  P  0.75  39.20  19.09  2877  2180  0.23  814  0.57  0.59  0.04  0.00  2.78  94287  94252 
UBI  P  1  39.13  18.92  2850  2164  0.33  1060  0.53  0.58  0.00  0.00  0.00  94281  94281 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.32  19.40  2928  2212  0.38  598  0.56  0.65  3.32  0.40  12.07  94262  90961 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.30  19.33  2920  2208  0.42  720  0.57  0.65  1.96  0.18  8.90  94268  92316 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.27  19.24  2910  2203  0.47  843  0.56  0.62  0.73  0.05  6.38  94272  93545 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.31  19.42  2924  2208  0.09  598  0.68  0.69  2.52  0.26  10.14  94288  91778 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.27  19.34  2911  2205  0.12  720  0.64  0.64  0.89  0.07  7.70  94290  93405 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.21  19.21  2886  2180  0.18  841  0.51  0.53  0.23  0.01  2.61  94257  94029 
WS  F  0.5  39.36  19.55  2940  2222  0.34  353  0.55  0.62  4.64  0.76  16.43  94262  89650 
WS  F  0.75  39.35  19.55  2938  2223  0.36  352  0.59  0.66  4.16  0.62  14.95  94270  90137 
WS  F  1  39.34  19.56  2936  2223  0.39  352  0.62  0.68  3.65  0.50  13.79  94277  90651 
WS  P  0.5  39.35  19.57  2938  2218  0.03  352  0.66  0.71  4.18  0.65  15.57  94285  90131 
WS  P  0.75  39.35  19.57  2937  2222  0.03  352  0.68  0.73  3.63  0.54  14.82  94289  90677 
WS  P  1  39.33  19.55  2928  2213  0.06  352  0.64  0.66  3.01  0.38  12.59  94275  91280 19 
 
 
   
Table 9. Equilibrium: h h h h = -1 
 









































































































































































































CURRENT  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  94255  90047 
GMI  F  0.5  39.30  19.29  2925  2204  0.31  193  0.54  0.60  3.09  0.32  10.40  94254  91181 
GMI  F  0.75  39.25  19.13  2911  2197  0.37  269  0.53  0.60  0.93  0.06  6.82  94257  93332 
GMI  F  1  39.20  18.95  2892  2187  0.45  356  0.47  0.54  0.01  0.00  0.24  94255  94250 
GMI  P  0.5  39.29  19.31  2923  2200  0.01  193  0.64  0.66  2.50  0.26  10.49  94275  91790 
GMI  P  0.75  39.25  19.13  2906  2192  0.05  269  0.58  0.60  0.84  0.05  5.89  94268  93431 
GMI  P  1  39.18  18.94  2880  2173  0.14  356  0.48  0.52  0.01  0.00  0.38  94246  94241 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.32  19.44  2933  2213  0.36  406  0.58  0.62  3.90  0.51  13.18  94263  90383 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.30  19.37  2927  2210  0.40  435  0.62  0.65  2.79  0.29  10.23  94269  91495 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.28  19.29  2918  2204  0.45  467  0.61  0.64  1.55  0.13  8.17  94272  92735 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  39.32  19.45  2930  2208  0.06  405  0.68  0.70  3.44  0.42  12.33  94284  90865 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  39.29  19.38  2923  2206  0.07  435  0.67  0.69  2.31  0.24  10.29  94284  91987 
GMI+WS  P  1  39.25  19.29  2908  2192  0.12  466  0.60  0.58  0.81  0.09  11.24  94266  93460 
UBI  F  0.5  39.26  19.28  2913  2205  0.41  568  0.61  0.63  0.88  0.06  7.08  94276  93404 
UBI  F  0.75  39.21  19.12  2895  2196  0.50  814  0.58  0.57  0.06  0.00  3.37  94282  94225 
UBI  F  1  39.15  18.95  2872  2184  0.60  1060  0.54  0.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  94281  94281 
UBI  P  0.5  39.25  19.29  2907  2199  0.13  568  0.66  0.62  0.52  0.04  7.10  94298  93779 
UBI  P  0.75  39.19  19.12  2883  2186  0.23  814  0.61  0.59  0.04  0.00  3.01  94297  94261 
UBI  P  1  39.12  18.94  2856  2170  0.33  1060  0.57  0.58  0.00  0.00  0.00  94290  94290 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.31  19.42  2929  2213  0.38  598  0.60  0.65  3.32  0.40  12.10  94267  90966 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.29  19.34  2922  2210  0.42  720  0.63  0.66  1.97  0.18  8.97  94274  92320 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.26  19.26  2912  2206  0.47  843  0.62  0.62  0.73  0.05  6.48  94277  93550 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.30  19.44  2925  2209  0.09  598  0.70  0.70  2.53  0.26  10.17  94295  91781 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.26  19.37  2914  2208  0.11  720  0.69  0.65  0.90  0.07  7.69  94299  93408 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.20  19.24  2891  2185  0.18  841  0.57  0.54  0.23  0.01  2.81  94266  94039 
WS  F  0.5  39.35  19.57  2940  2223  0.34  353  0.62  0.62  4.64  0.76  16.41  94268  89651 
WS  F  0.75  39.34  19.57  2938  2223  0.36  352  0.63  0.66  4.16  0.62  14.96  94274  90141 
WS  F  1  39.33  19.58  2936  2224  0.39  352  0.66  0.69  3.65  0.50  13.78  94283  90652 
WS  P  0.5  39.34  19.59  2938  2218  0.03  352  0.70  0.71  4.19  0.65  15.51  94290  90125 
WS  P  0.75  39.34  19.59  2937  2223  0.03  352  0.72  0.73  3.63  0.54  14.87  94295  90683 




   
Table 10. Equilibrium: h h h h = -∞ 
 









































































































































































































Current  39.35  19.45  2930  2191  --  101  --  --  4.23  0.58  13.71  94255  90047 
GMI  F  0.5  39.28  18.62  2899  2167  0.32  198  0.06  0.49  2.88  0.30  10.56  94031  91173 
GMI  F  0.75  39.19  17.83  2859  2135  0.39  281  0.04  0.42  0.76  0.05  6.03  93825  93077 
GMI  F  1  39.10  17.06  2816  2104  0.48  379  0.05  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  93628  93628 
GMI  P  0.5  39.27  18.65  2881  2163  0.02  197  0.07  0.54  2.39  0.25  10.34  94057  91683 
GMI  P  0.75  39.19  17.89  2841  2134  0.07  280  0.06  0.46  0.59  0.04  6.63  93852  93267 
GMI  P  1  39.08  17.08  2789  2091  0.17  378  0.06  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  93629  93629 
GMI+WS  F  0.5  39.31  18.82  2909  2178  0.37  405  0.07  0.53  3.88  0.51  13.03  94058  90213 
GMI+WS  F  0.75  39.25  18.20  2879  2153  0.41  436  0.05  0.47  2.55  0.26  10.35  93884  91358 
GMI+WS  F  1  39.19  17.49  2844  2125  0.46  471  0.04  0.41  1.25  0.11  8.57  93684  92449 
GMI+WS  P  0.5  39.30  18.84  2891  2173  0.06  405  0.08  0.61  3.35  0.42  12.44  94080  90752 
GMI+WS  P  0.75  39.25  18.19  2859  2150  0.08  435  0.07  0.52  2.13  0.22  10.45  93890  91785 
GMI+WS  P  1  39.16  17.47  2817  2111  0.14  470  0.05  0.42  0.76  0.08  10.33  93671  92918 
UBI  F  0.5  39.25  18.67  2891  2171  0.41  568  0.09  0.54  0.86  0.06  6.83  94071  93220 
UBI  F  0.75  39.16  17.92  2847  2139  0.52  814  0.08  0.49  0.04  0.00  3.59  93875  93840 
UBI  F  1  39.06  17.14  2800  2103  0.62  1060  0.08  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  93669  93669 
UBI  P  0.5  39.23  18.61  2865  2162  0.14  568  0.11  0.56  0.46  0.03  7.25  94070  93615 
UBI  P  0.75  39.13  17.86  2818  2127  0.24  814  0.10  0.53  0.02  0.00  2.35  93870  93850 
UBI  P  1  39.02  17.07  2765  2087  0.35  1060  0.09  0.51  0.00  0.00  0.00  93659  93659 
UBI+WS  F  0.5  39.30  18.78  2905  2178  0.38  595  0.08  0.55  3.29  0.39  11.76  94057  90789 
UBI+WS  F  0.75  39.24  18.10  2872  2152  0.43  715  0.07  0.47  1.95  0.17  8.48  93866  91932 
UBI+WS  F  1  39.17  17.40  2836  2125  0.48  835  0.06  0.42  0.70  0.04  5.76  93669  92982 
UBI+WS  P  0.5  39.29  18.85  2886  2175  0.10  595  0.10  0.61  2.58  0.26  10.01  94096  91537 
UBI+WS  P  0.75  39.22  18.19  2850  2151  0.12  715  0.10  0.54  0.87  0.07  7.54  93904  93046 
UBI+WS  P  1  39.12  17.46  2803  2107  0.19  833  0.07  0.44  0.09  0.00  4.17  93676  93589 
WS  F  0.5  39.33  18.96  2900  2187  0.34  350  0.06  0.54  4.74  0.77  16.28  94066  89366 
WS  F  0.75  39.29  18.40  2874  2167  0.37  348  0.06  0.51  4.08  0.62  15.15  93889  89854 
WS  F  1  39.26  17.84  2848  2147  0.40  345  0.05  0.46  3.71  0.50  13.57  93720  90052 
WS  P  0.5  39.33  18.91  2896  2181  0.04  350  0.07  0.62  4.21  0.64  15.23  94068  89888 
WS  P  0.75  39.29  18.31  2868  2162  0.04  347  0.06  0.56  3.76  0.54  14.37  93875  90148 
WS  P  1  39.23  17.73  2836  2133  0.07  344  0.05  0.43  2.96  0.38  12.83  93684  90755 21 
 
Appendix A. The microecometric model 
 
A.1.  Household behaviour 
The basic modelling framework belongs to the family of the Random Utility models and is similar to the one adopted in a 
series of papers by Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2011) and Colombino et al. (2010).
11  We will 
consider households with two decision-makers (couples) or one decision-maker (singles). In both cases the decision-
makers are aged 20 – 55 and are not retired or students. Of course there might be other people in the household, but their 
behaviour is taken as exogenous.  
A couple n is assumed to solve the following problem 
 (A.1) 
, , , max ( , , , )
( , , )
F M
n




F F M M
U C h h
h A
h A







( ) , , ,
n
F M U C h h e  = utility function 
g h = average weekly hours of work required by the chosen job in the choice set for partner of gender g = F (female) or M 
(male); 
A= set of 12 discrete values (see section A.3);  
n
g w = hourly wage rate of partner g; 
n y  = vector of exogenous household gross incomes; 
C  = net disposable household income; 
e  = random variable that captures the effect of unobserved characteristics of the household-job match; 
R = tax-transfer rule that transforms gross incomes into net available household income.  
 
The first two constraints of problem (A.1) say that the hours of work  g h  are chosen within a discrete set of values A
including also 0 hours. This discrete set of values can be interpreted as the actual choice set (maybe determined by 
institutional constraints) or as approximations to the true (possibly continuous) choice set.  
The third constraint says that net income C is the result of a tax-transfer rule R applied to gross incomes.  
                                                 
11 Surveys of various approaches to modelling labour supply for tax reform simulation are provided by Creedy et al. (2005), Bourguignon et al. 
(2006) and Meghir et al. (2008). 
 22 
 
We write the utility function  ( , , , )
n
F M U C h h e as the sum of a systematic part and a random component: 
(A.2)             U ( , , , ) ( ( , , ), , , ; )
n n n n n
F M F F M M F M C h h V R w h w h y h h Z e q e = +   
where 
n Z  is a vector of household characteristics and q  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The interpretation of 
the random variable e  is analogous to the one given by McFadden in his presentations of the Conditional Logit model 
(McFadden, 1974): besides the observed variables, there are characteristics of the household-job match that are observed 
by the household but not by the econometrician; the random variable e  is meant to account for the contribution to utility 
by those characteristics.
12 Under the assumption that e  is i.i.d. extreme value, it is well known that the probability that 
household n subject to tax-transfer regime R chooses  , F M h f h m = = is given by 
( ) { }
( ) { }
exp ( , , ), , , ;
(A.3)    ( , ; , )
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In a similar way, a single s of gender g is assumed to solve a constrained utility maximization problem as follows: 
(A.4) 













h = average weekly hours of work required by the chosen job. 
In this case, the utility function  ( , , )
s
g U C h e  can be written as the sum of a systematic part and a random component: 
(A.5)    ( , ; ) ( ( , ), , ; )
s s s s







   
                                                 
12  Most  of  the  labour  supply  literature  adopting  the  Conditional  Logit  framework  tends  to  privilege  a  different  interpretation  of  the  random 
component, where the true utility function is just the systematic component V of expression (A.2) and the random variable e  is an optimization error 
(e.g. Van Soest 1995 and Duncan and Giles 1996). An implication of this interpretation is that the econometrician is assumed to know more than the 
household itself: the econometrician knows that the true utility is V, while the households base their choices on a wrong utility level U. We find this 
interpretation less acceptable than the one originally proposed by McFadden, so here we follow the latter. The interpretation we adopt, however, 
implies that we cannot test for the (local) quasi-concavity of the utility function: we estimate V, and we could make a test on V, but the true utility 
function is not V but U, and U is a function of an unknown random variable . e  23 
 
A.2. Empirical specification of preferences 
We choose a quadratic specification since it is linear-in-parameters and it represents a good compromise between 
flexibility and ease of estimation:       
2 2 2
                  ( ) ( )
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                      ( ) ( ) ( )( )
n
C F F M M
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= + - + - +
+ + - + - +
+ - + - + - -
       
2 2 (A.7)           ( ) ( ) ( )
s
C g g CC gg g Cg g V C T h C T h C T h q q q q q = + - + + - + -
  where  
n V  and  
s V  denote the systematic part of the utility function respectively for couples and singles and T denotes 
total available time.   
Some of the above parameters  s q  are made dependent on characteristics:  
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                  Age of the wife Age of the wife
                          + #Children #Children under 6 (#Children 6-10)
(A.8)          Age of the husband Age of the
  F F F F
F F F
M M M M
q b b b
b b b
q b b b
= + + +
+ +
= + + ( )
( ) ( )





0 1 2 3
4 5
 husband
                          + #Children #Children under 6 (#Children 6-10)
                   Age Age #Children
                         + #Children under 6 (#Child
M M M
g g g g g
g g
b b b








                   (Household's size). C C C q b b = +
 
Notice that the parameters are separately estimated for couples, single females and single males. 
 
A.3. Empirical specification of the opportunity sets 
We assume that each partner in a couple household can choose between 10 values (from 1 to 80) of weekly hours of work. 
Each value is randomly drawn from one of the following ten intervals: 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, 25-32, 33-40, 41-48, 49-56, 57-
64, 65-72, 73-80. Moreover they can also choose to be out-of-work but we don’t distinguish between activity and 
unemployment status (therefore there is one alternative with zero hours of work). Thus each couple household chooses 
among 121 alternatives. In order to compute net household incomeC  for each one of the household jobs contained in
A A ´ , we use the EUROMOD Microsimulation model.
13 In other words EUROMOD mimics the tax-transfer rule R. 
Wage rates for those who are observed as not employed are imputed on the basis of a wage equation estimated on the 
                                                 
13 EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union that enables researchers and policy analysts to calculate, in a 
comparable manner, the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes and work incentives for the population of each country and for the EU as 
a whole. EUROMOD was originally designed by a research team under the direction of Holly Sutherland at the Department of Economics in 
Cambridge, UK. It is now developed and updated at the Microsimulation Unit at ISER (University of Essex, UK).  24 
 
employed subsample and corrected for sample selection. For the single households, we assume that the single household 
head can choose among the same set of 11 alternatives as where each partner of a couple household chooses.
14    
The data typically show a more or less pronounced concentration of people around hours corresponding to full-time, part-
time and non-working. The models of the type outlined above are typically unable to reproduce these peaks. A useful 
procedure consists of adding alternative-specific dummies. We define the following dummies for part-time, full-time, 









1 if  17     32  
            
0 otherwise
1 if  33     48  
           
0 otherwise
1 if  49     
(A.9)   
0 otherwise
1 if 0     
            
0 otherwise





























 g = F (female) or M (male).
             
Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999) and Dagsvik (2000) provide a formal justification of this procedure: assuming a non-uniform 
probability density function of the alternatives in the opportunity set and adopting an appropriate empirical specification 
allows rewriting the choice probabilities respectively for couple and single households as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) { }
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where the  's g  and the  ’s are parameters to be estimated. The coefficients 's g will reflect, possibly besides other costs or 
utility components, the different availability or density of different types of jobs. This interpretation of the dummies 
entails an interpretation of the model as representing a matching process (between types of household and types of jobs) 
rather than simply a labour supply decision and forms the basis for a simulation procedure that accounts for market 
equilibrium (see section A.7).  
                                                 





The parameters are estimated by Maximum Likelihood. For the estimation and simulation exercise presented in this paper 
we use the Italian dataset generated by EUROMOD team from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
1998.  
The inclusion criteria (rather common in the literature on behavioural evaluation of tax reforms) are as follows: 
-  Couple and single households; 
-  Employed (self-employed included), unemployed or inactive (students and disabled are excluded); 
-  Both partners of couple households and heads of single households aged 20 – 55. 
The estimates based on the sample of couples, single men and single women (respectively 2955, 291 and 366 
observations) are reported in Table A.1.  
The crucial preference parameters are: 
0 C b  and  CC q  (related to the marginal utility of income); 
0 F b  and  FF q  (related to the marginal utility of wife’s leisure); 
0 M b  and  MM q  (related to the marginal utility of husband’s leisure). 
0 g b  and  gg q  (related to the marginal utility of single household head leisure). 
The other parameters  's b and  's q measure the effects of various interactions of leisure times and income among 
themselves and with household characteristics. 
The marginal utility of income and the marginal utility of wife’s and husband’s leisure appear to be positive and 
decreasing (at least at the observed choices).   
The wife’s and the husband’s leisure appear to be complements, in the sense that more leisure of one of them has a 
positive effect on the marginal utility of leisure of the other one.  
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Table A.1. Parameter estimates 
  Couple  Single female  Single Male 
0 F b   .3301752***  .1562657   
1 F b   -.0077954***  -.0085422*   
2 F b   .0001051***  .0001062*   
3 F b   .0086118***  .0097963   
4 F b   -.0018444  -.0025955   
5 F b   .0030899  .0130587   
0 M b   .0338491    .2237299* 
1 M b   .001687    -.0053004 
2 M b   -.0000218    .0000694 
3 M b   .0035718    -.0685087 
4 M b   -.0105606***    .0614548 
5 M b   -.0077151**    .0634671 
0 C b   .0004311***  -.0001394  .0002968 
1 C b   -.0000251  .0000433  -.0000642 
CC q   -9.12e-09*  -1.42e-08  -8.87e-09 
FF q   -.0008251***  .0008978*   
MM q   .0003973**    -.0000417 
CF q   -1.92e-06*  5.70e-06   27 
 
   
 Table A.1. Parameter estimates (cont’d) 
  Couple  Single female  Single Male 
CM q   -1.01e-06    -1.23e-06 
FM q   .0001992*     
1 F g   3.07818***  4.069606***   
2 F g   5.223014***  7.077753***   
3 F g   5.260581***  6.363261***   
4 F g   -3.356024***  -1.131054**   
1 M g   3.673685***    2.997396*** 
2 M g   8.314315***    6.786832*** 
3 M g   8.917805***    7.232927*** 
4 M g   -.8084671***    -.7926529 
For the meaning of the coefficient symbols see expressions A.6, A.7 and A.8.  
*** = significance < 1% 
**  =  significance < 5% 
*    =  significance < 10% 28 
 
 
A.5. Behavioural simulation method 
The estimated model is used to simulate the effects of alternative hypothetical tax-transfer reforms. Suppose we are 
interested in some tax-transfer rule R. We explain the procedure with reference to the case of couples. Let 
( , ; , , )
n P f m R q g  be the probability that couple household n chooses ( , ) f m under the R tax-transfer regime, computed on 
the basis of the estimated parameters. Suppose we are interested in simulating the expected value of some function
( , )
n f m y : it might be the net available income under the new rule, hours worked, taxes paid etc. Then we compute the 
expected value of that variable after the policy is implemented as follows:     
(A.11)                            ( ( , )) ( , ) ( , , ; , , )
n n n n
f m
E f m f m P f m Z R y y q g
ÎW ÎW
= ∑∑ .   
A similar procedure is used to simulate the effects of alternative tax-transfer reforms for singles.    
 
A.6. Social evaluation 
In section 3 of the main text we define two Social Welfare functions. Their computation requires the following steps. 
1) Expected maximum utility attained by household n under tax-transfer regime( ) R :
15
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     + +          
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑  
2) Interpersonally-comparable-metric utility
16 of household i under tax regime R, ( ). i R m  
Let
0
0 ( ) v R be the expected maximum utility attained by a reference household under a reference tax-transfer regime. In this 
paper we choose as reference household the poorest single in 1998 and as reference tax-transfer system the 1998 system: 
(A.13)    ( )
5 5
0 0 0 0
0 0
1 1
( ) ln exp ( , ), , ; , ( ) ( ) k k k k
h k k
R V R w h y h Z D h D h n q g g g
ÎW = =
   
= + +    
    ∑ ∑ ∑  
The interpersonally-comparable money-metric utility of household n under tax regime R,  ( )
n R m , is then defined by: 




ln exp ( ), , ; , ( ) ( ) ( ).
n n
k k k k
h k k
V R h Z D h D h R m q g g g n
ÎW = =
   
+ + =    
    ∑ ∑ ∑  
                                                 
15 For the derivation of this expression, see McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva et al. (1985). The same methodology for empirical welfare evaluation is 
used by Colombino (1998). 
16 A comprehensive explanation of the procedure adopted for developing interpersonally comparable measures of utility is provided by King (1983). 29 
 
In other words,  ( )
n R m is the net available income needed by the reference household under the reference tax-transfer 
regime in order to attain the same expected maximum utility level of household n under tax-transfer regime R. 
3) Expressions (A.12) – (A.14) assume that the household is able to choose the constrained utility-maximizing “job”. In 
the Non-behavioural simulation this assumption is not appropriate anymore. The procedure we adopt is explained 
hereafter; it is referred to single households, the extension to couples is immediate. 
Let 
n h = hours of work of household n under the 1998 regime, 
0 h = hours of work of the reference household under the 1998 regime. 
Then ( )
n R m is defined by: 
(A.15)    ( ) ( )
0 0 ( ), , ; , ( , ), , ; ,
n n n n n n V R h Z V R w h y h Z m q g q g = . 




                      ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
(A.16)
                      ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
GSW R R I R













m m = ∑  
( ) I R = Gini coefficient of the sample distribution of ( ) n R m  
p(R) = head-count poverty ratio. 
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Appendix B. Simulation under equilibrium 
 
The microeconometric model illustrated in Appendix A adopts the widely used refinement consisting of introducing 
alternative-specific constants, which should account for a number of factors such as the different density or accessibility 
of different types of jobs, search or fixed costs and systematic utility components otherwise not accounted for (expression 
A.10). Many papers have adopted a similar procedure, e.g.: Van Soest (1995), Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2011a), Kalb 
(2000), Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), Kornstad et al. (2007) and Colombino et al. (2010).  All the authors adopting the 
“dummies refinement” so far have performed the simulations while leaving the dummies’ coefficients g ’s unchanged. 
The policy simulation is most commonly interpreted as a comparative statics exercise, where different equilibria – 
induced  by different tax-transfer regimes – are compared. We claim that the standard procedure in general is not 
consistent with the comparative statics interpretation. According to a basic notion of equilibrium, the number of people 
willing to work must equal to the number of available jobs. Since the g ’s reflect – at least in part – the number and the 
composition of available jobs, and since the number of people willing to work and their distribution across different job 
types in general change as a consequence of the reforms, it follows that in general the g ’s must also change. A series of 
papers by Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2011a), building on a matching model developed by Dagsvik (1994, 2000), extend 
the basic random utility approach to include a random choice set and provide a structural interpretation of the “dummies 
refinement” that leads very naturally to a simulation procedure consistent with comparative statics.
17  
For simplicity of exposition we consider here a single individual. The probability that a job of type j is chosen is 
(B.1)   
( ) ( )
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It can then be shown (Aaberge and Colombino 2011a) that – under certain assumptions – the coefficients of the dummy 
variables have the following interpretation: 
(B.2)  4 ln
J
H
g   =  
 
   
 and  









= =  
 
   
                                                 
17 A different procedure for  equilibrium simulation – which however  would not be appropriate  with our microeconometric  model – has been 
proposed by Creedy and Duncan (2001). The possible inconsistency of the Creedy-Duncan procedure when using a model of the type we adopt was 
suggested to me by Lennart Flood.    31 
 
where J = number of market jobs (i.e. opportunities with h > 0),  1 J  is the number of jobs with17     32  h £ £ ,  2 J  is the 
number of jobs with33     48  h £ £ and  3 J  is the number of jobs with 49   .  h £ H and  k A are normalizing constants that 
account for the presence of factors other than jobs density (such as search or fixed costs, number of non-market 
opportunities etc.). 
To further simplify the exposition we assume now that only the dummy 
4 D is introduced, i.e. we rewrite the choice 
probability as follows:
18 
(B.4)    ( ) ( ) { }
( ) ( ) { }
4 4
4 4
exp ( , ), ; ,
( ; , , )
exp ( , ), ; ,
h A
V R wj y j Z D j
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Let us assume a constant-elasticity labour demand function 
(B.5)  J Kw
h =  
where wis the average wage rate, K is a constant and h  is the wage elasticity of the demand for labour. In this paper we 
present simulation results based on alternative values of h . Notice that givenh and the observed pre-reform number of 
employed (and – in equilibrium – jobs) J we can retrieve K. Moreover, given the estimate of  4 g , we can retrieve H from 
(B.2). Let us writew w u = + .  
Using B.2 and B.5 we write: 







= º  
 
   
We then define  ( , )) i R w p as the probability that individual i is working given tax-transfer regime R and average wage rate
T w : 
(B.7)  ( ) ( ) { }
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where  i iT w u w + = . Assuming that the choices under the tax-transfer regime R corresponds are in equilibrium, we must 
have: 
                                                 
18 The extension to couples and to the multi-dummy case is explained in Colombino (2010). 32 
 
(B.8)  ( , , ( ))) i R R R
i
R w w Kw
h p g = ∑ .   
where  R w  denotes the mean of the equilibrium wage distribution.  
 
 
Perfectly rigid demand 
In the special case of a perfectly rigid demand (zero elasticity), the number of jobs remains fixed but the wage rate must 
be adjusted so that the number of people willing to work under the new regime is equal to the pre-reform number of jobs: 
(B.10)  ( , , ( )) i R R
i
R w w J p g = ∑ .   
Perfectly elastic demand 
When the demand for labour is perfectly elastic, the market is always in equilibrium at the initial wage rate. However, 
since the number of working people in general will change under a new tax-transfer rule and since the number of jobs in 
equilibrium must be equal to the number of people willing to work, it follows that the parameter  4 ln
J
H
g   =  
 
must 
change. Then the equilibrium condition is  
(B.11) 
4R J He
g = .   
where J is the current (observed or simulated) number of employed. In this case wremains unchanged, while instead 4R g
must be directly adjusted so as to fulfil condition (B.11). The case with fixed wage rate and the demand absorbing any 
change in supply at that wage, actually corresponds to the scenario implicitly assumed in most tax-transfer simulations. 
However those simulations are not consistent since they do not take condition (B.11) into account. 
 
Equiproportional changes in J and H. 
One might consider a particular scenario in which J and H change in the same proportion as a consequence of a reform. 
For example one might argue that the economy is organized so that there is a fixed proportion between the dimension of 
the labour market and the dimension of the “leisure” economy.
19 Clearly under this assumption the coefficient  4 g should 
be left unchanged. The simulation that in the main text we label as No Equilibrium could also be interpreted as 
corresponding to this scenario. 
   
                                                 
19 This possibility was suggested by Rolf Aaberge in a comment to a previous version of this paper. 33 
 
Appendix C. The reforms 
 
Definitions: 
F F F x w h = = female gross earnings 
M M M x w h = = male gross earnings 
F M x x x = +  
F y = female unearned gross income 
M y = male unearned gross income 
m = other household net income 
F S = social security contributions (female) 
M S = social security contributions (male) 
F M S S S = +  
F F F F I g y S = + - =   taxable income (female) 
M M M M I g y S = + - =   taxable income (male) 
F M I I I = +  
P = poverty line  
N = number of people in the household 
G = αP N  with α = 1, 0.75, 0.50  
F C =  net disposable income (female) 
M C =  net disposable income (male) 
F M C m C C = + +  
T = taxes paid by the household 
B= benefits or transfers received by household 
q = average propensity to consumption 
r = average VAT rate  
w = proportional subsidy on the gross wage rate = 0.1 
(.) j = progressive tax function (from gross income to net income). The current (1998) marginal tax rates are as follows: 




Income Brackets  Marginal Tax Rates 
0 –  15  18 
15 –  30  26 
30 –  60  33 
60 – 135  39 
> 135  45 
Income brackets are in Millions of Lire (10 Millions of Lire = 5165 Euros). 
Under the 1998 system the above rates are applied to personal earnings, together with deductions, allowances and 
benefits. Under the reforms all deductions, tax credits and benefits are cancelled, the income brackets are kept unchanged 
and the marginal tax rates (either the flat or the progressive ones) are applied to the whole personal income (not just to 
earnings). 
 
Public Budget Constraint: 
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